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I. INTRODUCTION
This eleventh survey covers the legislative changes in the Workmen's
Compensation Act' which were adopted by the 1972 and 1973 sessions of
the Florida Legislature, and all related reported judicial decisions since
publication of the last survey.2
The 1972 legislature adopted six amendments to the Workmen's
Compensation Act. Section 440.01(1)(b)(c) was amended to include
officers elected at the polls within the definition of employment, the
amendment becoming effective November 10, 1972. Section 440.12 (2) (3)
was amended to increase maximum weekly compensation for disability
resulting from injuries occurring after June 30, 1972, from $56 per week
to $66 per week; and the minimum was increased from $12 to $20 per
week. Section 440.44(2) was amended with respect to the fund from which
salaries of members of the Industrial Relations Commission are paid and
subsections (3) and (4) were amended to delete the requirement that the
Chief of the Bureau of Workmen's Compensation be an attorney.' Section
440.56(3) was changed to eliminate the necessity of a public hearing
* Member of the Florida Bar.
1. FLA. STAT. ch. 440 (1973).
2. The previous survey includes Florida cases appearing in volumes 219 through 250 of
the Southern Reporter, Second Series, and laws enacted by the 1970 and 1971 sessions of the
Florida Legislature.
3. The effective date of this amendment was March 31, 1972.
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when the Division of Labor and Employment Opportunities adopts cer-
tain non-discretionary rules or requirements in accordance with a federal
rule or mandate.
The 1973 legislature broadened the coverage of the Workmen's
Compensation Act to include all private employments in which one or
more employees are employed by the same employer.4 Section 440.09(4),
which permitted a reduction of pension benefits by an amount equal to
workmen's compensation benefits paid at the same time by the state or
any political sub-division thereof or public or quasi-public corporation on
account of the same injury, was repealed. Section 440.12 (1) was amended
to permit payment of compensation for the first seven days of disability,
if the injury results in disability of more than 14 days. Previously, the
statute required that the disability exceed 21 days before compensation
would be payable for the first seven days. This section was further
amended to increase the maximum weekly compensation payments from
$66 to $80 per week. The foregoing amendments were effective July 1,
1973.
Newly enacted and effective July 1, 1973, is a section allowing a
reduction in workmen's compensation benefits to the extent that the
combined total of social security benefits and workmen's compensation
benefits paid by the same employer exceed 80 percent of the employee's
average weekly wage.5 The reduction of compensation benefits is not
applicable once the injured worker reaches the age of 62 years. The
amendment permits flexibility in the event of a federal deduction or
increase in the percentage of average earnings permissible. It further pro-
vides that no reduction of compensation can take place until the Social
Security Administration has determined the amount of social security
payable and the employee actually has begun to receive the benefits
thereof.
Section 440.16 was amended to increase the allowable amount pay-
able for funeral expenses from $500 to $1,000,1 and death benefits from
$15,000 to $25,000 (with elimination of the 350 week limitation). 7 The
allowable percentages of average weekly wage for a widow and widower,
if there are no children, was increased from 35 percent to 60 percent.8
Insurance carriers writing workmen's compensation insurance are
now required to file a written notice within ten days after the issuance
of a policy or contract of insurance or renewal certificate with the Divi-
sion of Labor and Employment Opportunities; I and employers who do not
secure the payment of compensation may now be enjoined from employ-
4. FLA. STAT. § 440.02(1)(b)(2) (1973). Previously coverage was limited to private
employments in which three or more employees were employed.
5. FLA. STAT. § 440.15(10) (1973).
6. FLA. STAT. § 440.16(1) (1973).
7. FLA. STAT. § 440.06(2) (1973).
8. FLA. STAT. § 440.06(2)(a),(b) (1973).
9. FLA. STAT. § 440.36(4) (1973).
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ing individuals or from conducting business until such payment has been
secured. s Section 440.42 (2) was amended to prohibit expiration or can-
cellation of workmen's compensation insurance policies until at least 30
days have elapsed after a notice of cancellation has been sent to the Divi-
sion and employer. Furthermore, in cases where there is coverage by two
or more workmen's compensation carriers for- one employer, section
440.42(2) creates a presumption that the policy with the later effective
date shall be enforced and that the earlier policy terminated upon the
effective date of the latter. Should both policies carry the same effective
date, the amendment permits cancellation by the insurer instanter upon
the filing of a notice of cancellation with the Division, and service of a
copy upon the employer.
Judicial activity decreased somewhat during the period surveyed.
Seventy-two opinions dealing with workmen's compensation were handed
down by the Supreme Court of Florida during this period. Additionally,
the district court of appeal decided 12 cases which dealt primarily with
subrogation rights and third-party claims. Significant Industrial Relations
Commission decisions were affirmed by the Supreme Court of Florida
without opinion and will be mentioned during this survey. The presenta-
tion of case law will follow the topical indexes utilized in prior surveys
with elimination of topics where no judicial activity has taken place. The
period surveyed established no activity regarding the Special Disability
Fund or the doctrine of apportionment.
II. HEART CASES
The classification of case law into two separate categories regarding
compensable heart attack situations was summarized in Reynolds v.
Whitney Tank Lines." In that case, the claimant sustained two separate
accidents resulting in physical injuries following which he developed pain
and shortness of breath. He was eventually hospitalized and found to be
suffering a myocardial infarction. The Judge of Industrial Claims found
the heart attack to be the result of the accidents based upon the testimony
of the claimant, the claimant's wife, and a physician, the combination of
which was found to be sufficient to support causal relationship between
the second accident and the heart attack. In affirming the award, the court
pointed out that the heart attack was the result of an accident and, there-
fore, compensable.
This type of heart attack was distinguished from the second category
of compensable heart attacks which do not result from an accident but,
rather, result from unusual stress or strain on the job. An interesting
factual situation resulted in an award of additional benefits based upon a
subsequent heart attack in Arroyo v. Crown Hotel. 2 There, the claimant
10. FLA. STAT. § 440.43 (1973).
11. 279 So. 2d 293, 296 (Fla. 1973).
12. 275 So. 2d 226 (Fla. 1973).
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sustained injuries to his neck, back, left shoulder, and abdomen as a result
of a work-related accident. He was awarded an eight percent permanent
partial disability to the body and returned to work for the same employer.
While engaged in this subsequent employment as a busboy, the claimant
became apprehensive because the employer was short a number of bus-
boys, thereby requiring the additional work load to fall upon the claimant.
While the claimant was in this pained and emotionally upset state, a table
guest began complaining bitterly to him and exchanged what he consid-
ered to be very obscene, nasty, and upsetting remarks. The claimant then
developed a sudden onset of severe chest pain. It was noted that the
claimant, during periods of extreme anxiety in the previous months, had
developed short periods of chest pain. The Judge of Industrial Claims
modified the prior award of eight percent and awarded additional com-
pensation based upon the development of a cardiac neurosis which was
found to be causally related to and directly attributable to the claimant's
employment with the Crown Hotel. The reversal by the Industrial Rela-
tions Commission based upon lack of "accident" was quashed by the
supreme court, which found competent substantial medical evidence to
indicate that the claimant's preceding industrial injury, disability or
condition was worsened by the conversion reaction brought on by stress
and excitement occurring on the job. In Soloff v. U-Totem, Inc.," two
subsequent heart attacks which followed an original compensable heart
attack were found to be causally related thereto, and an award of addi-
tional disability benefits based upon permanent total disability was
upheld.
III. DisABIITY BENEFITS
A. Occupational Diseases
In Phelps v. Gunite Construction & Rentals, Inc.,'4 an award of
20 percent permanent partial disability of the body based upon contact
dermatitis found to be the result of the claimant's occupation was upheld.
In this case, the opinion dealt primarily with the greater degree of proof
necessary to sustain a compensation order for occupational disease.
In Caropreso v. Publix Super Markets,5 a claimant was found to
have sustained an aggravation of a pre-existing condition as a result of
occupational disease. In that case, the claimant's occupation required that
he immerse his hands in ice water and also that he work in rooms with
temperatures of 40 to 50 degrees and go into a room where it was 34
degrees to handle cold vegetables. The medical opinion established that
the exposure to cold aggravated a pre-existing collagen disease. The award
of permanent total disability based upon occupational disease in terms of
13. 257 So. 2d 31 (Fla. 1971).
14. 279 So. 2d 829 (Fla. 1973).
15. 277 So. 2d 279 (Fla. 1973).
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aggravation was upheld. A similar result occurred in Dillow v. Florida
Portland Cement Plant, 6 wherein the inhalation of cement dust was
found to have aggravated lung cancer. However, in Brooks v. State De-
partment of Transportation,"7 a skin irritation diagnosed as miliaria
rubra, a disorder often called heat rash, was held not to be due to occu-
pational disease or accident, the claimant having failed to meet the burden
of proof required by statute to establish an occupational disease.' 8
B. Scheduled Disability Benefits
The statutory limitation of disability benefits in scheduled injuries
to a designated number of weeks or portions thereof' 9 and case law ap-
plicable thereto, were detailed in the Industrial Relations Commission
decision of Bush & LaFoe v. Williamson.20 There, the Industrial Relations
Commission reversed an order of the Judge of Industrial Claims wherein
an award of 30 percent permanent partial disability of the body as a
whole was granted to a claimant who sustained two separate scheduled
injuries (25 percent disability of right foot and ten percent disability of
left foot) from the same accident. In addition to citing the statute, the
majority opinion summarized prior case law establishing the binding
effect of scheduled allowances and method of determining the amount of
compensation allowable for permanent disability to scheduled members.21
However, when the effect of the scheduled injury is such that an
injured workman's entire wage earning capacity is destroyed, the effect
of the scheduled disability is not binding and an award of permanent
total disability benefits may be made.22 An attempt to escape the effects
of the schedule proved unsuccessful in Sweeting v. Cohen-Ager, Inc.2" In
that case, the claimant sustained a 30 percent permanent partial disability
to his left leg. Although the claimant also suffered an anxiety reaction, it
was found that the anxiety reaction was not disabling and not in need of
treatment, thereby limiting the claimant to permanent disability benefits
for the injured leg.
C. The Body as a Whole: Disability Benefits
An award of 20 percent permanent partial disability based upon
wage earning capacity loss was upheld in Woodard v. Dade County
Board of Public Instruction,24 wherein the claimant sustained bodily
injuries as a result of a fall. Although still employed at the same job and
16. 258 So. 2d 266 (Fla. 1972).
17. 255 So. 2d 260 (Fla. 1971).
18. FLA. STAT. § 440.151(2) (1973).
19. FLA. STAT. § 440.15(3)(a)-(s) (1973).
20. Industrial Relations Comm'n decision 2-2323 (Sept. 11, 1973).
21. See dissenting opinions for contrary view.
22. Johnson v. Brasington-Cadillac Oldsmobile, Inc., 265 So. 2d 8 (Fla. 1972).
23. 257 So. 2d 544 (Fla. 1972).
24. 278 So. 2d 620 (Fla. 1973).
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receiving the same salary, the evidence established that the claimant was
physically limited, was doing lighter work, was losing time from work, and
suffered a resultant loss of job security. In affirming the award, the court
again summarized the factors and prior decisions regarding wage earning
capacity loss.
Two permanent total awards were affirmed which resulted from
bodily injuries. In Gibson v. Minute Maid Corp. 5 the physical injury to
the claimant's back resulted in a 15 percent anatomical disability. Again,
in affirming the award of permanent total disability, the court reviewed
prior decisions bearing upon factors to be considered in arriving at wage
earning capacity loss. Competent substantial evidence was found to exist
and the award of permanent total disability affirmed in Smith v. Lake
Butler Groves, Inc.28 There, the Industrial Relations Commission had
reversed and remanded the cause to the Judge of Industrial Claims for
further findings. In quashing the order of the Industrial Relations Com-
mission, the supreme court held that it would be a waste of time and
money to remand the cause for a more complete statement of findings
when review of the record amply supported the award of permanent total
disability benefits.
D. Death Benefits
The constitutionality of the Workmen's Compensation Act insofar
as it relates to compensation for death was challenged in Mullarkey v.
Florida Feed Mills, Inc.' The basis of the attack concerned the death of
an employee who left no surviving dependents. The action was brought by
a parent, individually and as administrator of his deceased minor son's
estate. In a split decision, the court held the death benefit provision to be
constitutional under the theory that the employee, by his own voluntary
act, chose to bind himself and his representatives and survivors in the
event of death to the provisions of the Workmen's Compensation Act.
IV. MEDICAL BENEFITS
Failure of a claimant to make express vocal request of an employer
or carrier for a particular treatment is not solely determinative of the
employer's or carrier's obligation to pay for medical expenses incurred if
the nature of the injury requires such treatment and the employer has
knowledge of the injury and did not provide the treatment. This is the
holding in Lance v. Witters Construction.28 In that case, the claimant had
received treatment at an osteopathic hospital from which he realized some
benefit. Subsequently, he came under the care of a medical physician who
25. 251 So. 2d 260 (Fla. 1971).
26. 275 So. 2d 229 (Fla. 1973).
27. 268 So. 2d 363 (Fla. 1972).
28. 270 So. 2d 4 (Fla. 1972).
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performed two separate spinal operations. The claimant did not improve
and asked the operating surgeon if he would approve a chiropractor for
treatment. The operating surgeon expressed no objection thereto but
stated that he would not recommend it. The claimant obtained chiro-
practic care from which he received some temporary relief. The award of
payment for the chiropractic care was upheld. In Miller v. Tribune Co., 29
the principles in the Lance case were again restated and payment of all
unauthorized medical examinations ordered. However, employer respon-
sibility was based upon equitable considerations, the employer having
accepted the unauthorized medical doctor's opinion regarding disability.
An injured workman's right to refuse surgery was discussed in
Henderson v. Booth.80 It was there held that a requirement of a fear of
death to render a refusal to undergo surgery reasonable is an improper
test and that fear of loss of ambulation can be sufficient to render the
refusal to undergo major surgery reasonable. Additionally, the burden was
placed upon employers and carriers to show unreasonableness and the
decision as to reasonableness was left to the Judge of Industrial Claims.
V. COVERAGE
The nature of the employment and duties performed were deter-
minative of coverage under the Workmen's Compensation Act and were
controlling in Pebble Hills Plantation v. Alexander.81 In that case the
Judge of Industrial Claims had denied coverage to an employee held to be
a domestic servant. In reversing and remanding the cause, the majority
of the Industrial Relations Commission pointed out that the law exempts
domestic servants in private homes and that the exclusions in the Work-
men's Compensation Act are to be given limited scope by restrictive
interpretation. It was there held that under the evidence, the claimant was
engaged as a caretaker and grounds keeper for the employer and that this
activity was not exempted employment.
An attempt to deny coverage to an injured "husband" was denied in
Muzika v. Butler Enterprises, Inc.82 There, the claimant worked for a
corporation in which the claimant's wife was an active officer. Other than
meals, the petitioner received his remuneration through the pay check of
his wife when he commenced work, the paycheck being placed in their
joint account each month. In reinstating the award of benefits, the court
held that the injured husband would qualify for compensation by the
meals which were furnished, even if the monetary reimbursement through
the wife were discounted.
In Tipper v. Great Lakes Chemical Co.,88 a claimant was requested
29. 275 So. 2d 242 (Fla. 1973).
30. 281 So. 2d 350 (Fla. 1973).
31. Industrial Relations Comm'n decision 2-2291 (Mar. 29, 1973).
32. 269 So. 2d 353 (Fla. 1972); Rosenbush v. City of N. Miami Beach, 281 So. 2d 298
(Fla. 1973) (volunteer policeman who received no salary held covered).
33. 281 So. 2d 10 (Fla. 1973).
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by a police chief to assist in preventing deadly gas from escaping cylinders
which had been strewn over a roadside following an automobile accident.
The claimant had experience in handling deadly gas and while assisting
in the emergency and as a result thereof was injured. The owners of the
truck which was carrying the gas were held to be the employers of the
claimant for the purposes of workmen's compensation coverage under the
theory of an implied contract of employment.
The lack of apparent contract, either written or verbal, between a
claimant and his employer by which the employer would become civilly
liable was not controlling in the case of Air Control Industries v.
Seckrest. 4 There, the element of control was held to be the determining
factor in distinguishing the relationship of an independent contractor
from that of an employee. A denial of coverage was reversed where a
contract existed between the parties which declared the relationship to
be that of an independent contractor, but where the evidence established
the claimant to be continuously on call and under the direction and con-
trol of his employer. 5 .
Through an advisory opinion, the Supreme Court of Florida reviewed
an alleged waiver of exemption from coverage and ultimately determined
that a claimant who was killed in an aircraft crash was not covered by the
Florida Workmen's Compensation Act where the record affirmatively dis-
closed that the airplane trip provided on the day of the accident was
furnished as a convenience to the employee rather than as an expressed or
implied part of the employment contract between the parties."6
During the period surveyed, a lunch break accident which occurred
while the claimant was driving a company truck upon which was
painted a company advertising display and which the claimant was au-
thorized to use as transportation in obtaining lunch was held compen-
sable;3 7 a death occurring to a claimant who was involved in a vehicular
accident while driving his own vehicle, but on special call to return to the
employer's premises, was held compensable; 8 injuries sustained in an
assault by a superintendent who had discharged the claimant, although
the event occurred away from the job site before working hours and the
superintendent was not the claimant's immediate supervisor, were found
compensable; 89 injuries incurred by an aggressor in an altercation oc-
curring after a cooling off period were held not compensable; 40 and in-
juries sustained while a claimant was on a concurrent or dual purpose
mission consistent with the remedial purpose of the Workmen's Com-
pensation Act was, therefore, compensable.4 '
34. Industrial Relations Comm'n decision 2-2293 (Mar. 21, 1973).
35. Justice v. Belford Trucking Co., 272 So. 2d 131 (Fla. 1972).
36. Allen v. Estate of Caman, 281 So. 2d 317 (Fla. 1973).
37. Reynolds v. Ferman Oldsmobile Co., 259 So. 2d 133 (Fla. 1972).
38. Feltner v. Southern Bell Tel. & Tel. Co., 274 So. 2d 530 (Fla. 1973).
39. Hill v. Gregg, Gibson & Gregg, Inc., 260 So. 2d 193 (Fla. 1972).
40. Dudley Forming Serv., Inc. v. Telley, 257 So. 2d 35 (Fla. 1971).
41. Davis v. Bert Friedman Court Rep. Serv., 251 So. 2d 129 (Fla. 1971).
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The effect of false representations in procuring employment as a
complete bar to coverage under the Workmen's Compensation Act was
considered in two separate cases. In City of Miami v. Ford,2 the claim-
ant obtained a job with the City of Miami as a garbage collector and
specifically stated to the employer's medical secretary that he had never
been involved in a motor vehicle accident and had never had a fracture or
a broken bone. In fact, the claimant had suffered a broken ankle, which
was repaired by insertion of a metal pin. Some two years later, the claim-
ant sustained injury to the same foot when the sanitation truck on which
he was riding went into a hole and the claimant's foot was bent backward
against the brace of the rear platform. Medical testimony established the
claimant's injury was due primarily to the pre-existing weakness of the
left ankle. A denial of compensation benefits was upheld. In the second
case, the claimant lied or omitted information relating to an earlier on-the-
job injury with an employer whose name was also omitted. In the ap-
plication, he denied ever having been previously injured and failed to
complete the blank space for physical defects. The supreme court upheld
the reversal by the Industrial Relations Commission of the Judge of
Industrial Claims' denial of benefits on the basis that there was no evi-
dence that the accident, which the claimant sustained in his present em-
ployment, would not have caused injury without the prior accident, and
upon the additional factors that there was no evidence that the claimant
was suffering any disability due to his prior injuries, and that the em-
ployer had already hired the claimant and, thereafter, requested the claim-
ant to complete a pre-employment application. This latter chronological
sequence was found sufficient to destroy the employer's argument of
reliance upon the misrepresentation in hiring the claimant.4
VI. THE COMPENSABLE ACCIDENT
Cataracts which developed in the eyes of a claimant who was re-
quired to look into electric furnaces which generated temperatures of
24,000 to 27,000 degrees to determine the proper color of materials being
treated in the furnaces were held compensable under the theory that the
cataracts were caused by the infrared radiation to which the claimant was
exposed on his job. In reversing a denial of benefits, the court stated:
"The accidental nature of an injury is not altered by the fact that, instead
of a single occurrence, the injury is the cumulated effect of a series of
occurrences."
44
A fractured skull occasioned by a fall was held not compensable in
Federal Electric Corp. v. Best.45 There, the original fall was due to a
fainting spell which was not work related. The evidence established that
42. 252 So. 2d 228 (Fla. 1971).
43. Georgetown Manor Furniture Co. v. Smith, 281 So. 2d 18 (Fla. 1973).
44. Worden v. Pratt & Whitney Aircraft, 256 So. 2d 209, 210 (Fla. 1971).
45. 274 So. 2d 886 (Fla. 1973).
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there was no compensable accident arising out of the employment and
no hazard of employment contributing to the injury.
VII. STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS
The decisions during the period of this survey bearing upon the
statute of limitations concerned attempts to revive the limitation period
which had already run. In Brown v. Giffen Industries,46 the claimant
alleged that a check issued two and one-half years earlier had been lost
and demanded reissuance of the check. Claim was then made but the
statute of limitations would run from the last payment of compensation,
which would be the reissued check. It was held that the statute of limita-
tions had run and that neither the re-issuance of a lost or misplaced
compensation check nor the holding of a compensation check for a period
of time after delivery would act to revive or toll the statute of limitations.
In Dean v. McLeod,47 an award had been entered and a subsequent peti-
tion for modification denied. Thereafter, a second petition for modifica-
tion was filed and the statute of limitations raised as a defense thereto.
The claimant urged that the filing of the second petition for modification
was timely in that it was filed within two years from the time of entry of
the order denying the first petition for modification. In rejecting the
argument and holding that the statute of limitations had run, the court
held that the interpretation of the claimant would allow the tolling of the
limitation period by the filing of any petition for modification, however
frivolous, and would render the statute of limitations totally void.
VIII. THE JUDGE OF INDUSTRIAL CLAIMS
The most significant of all decisions entered during this surveyed
period was the 1973 supreme court decision of Pierce v. Piper Aircraft
Corp.48 Prior to this decision, a long series of reversals and remands took
place based upon the failure of the Judge of Industrial Claims to make
adequate findings of fact on issues presented. What constituted "adequate
findings" was always subject to interpretation on a per case basis at the
appellate level. Reversals and remands by the Industrial Relations Com-
mission customarily found their way to the Supreme Court of Florida,
thereby increasing the case load of the court. All too frequently, the
court found the findings of the Judge of Industrial Claims adequate under
its prior holdings and was critical of the Industrial Relations Commission
for its reversal of the award or denial of benefits.49 Prior surveys noted
the expansion and increase of power and authority of the Judges of Indus-
46. 281 So. 2d 897 (Fla. 1973).
47. 270 So. 2d 726 (Fla. 1972).
48. 279 So. 2d 281 (Fla. 1973) (hereinafter referred to as Pierce].
49. Smith v. Lake Butler Groves, Inc., 275 So. 2d 229 (Fla. 1973) (remand for further
findings a waste of time and money); Collins v. Town of Palm Beach, 272 So. 2d 479 (Fla.
1973) (further findings not necessary or material) ; Beard v. Board of Pub. Instr., 253 So. 2d
428 (Fla. 1971) (remanded for further findings where all of injuries not considered).
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trial Claims which has continued during this survey under the Pierce
decision. Through this decision, the court receded from its prior decisions
respecting requirements imposed upon the Judge of Industrial Claims in
making his findings of fact and held:
We now hold the Judge of Industrial Claims need make only
such findings of ultimate material fact upon which he relies, as
are sufficient justification to show the basis of an award or a
denial of the claim. A long, verbose explanation of the reasoning
for making such findings of fact is not required. However, where
testimony of two or more expert witnesses of comparable
qualifications are in direct conflict, it will be helpful to the
Commission and this Court if some explanation is given as to
why the testimony of one is accepted and the other rejected.50
The court announced that its objective in changing the fact finding
requirements was to reduce the work load of Judges of Industrial Claims.
Undoubtedly, the effect of the decision will be to reduce the appellate
work load of both the Industrial Relations Commission and the supreme
court, as well as eliminate the majority of reversals and remands for
"adequate findings of fact." The Pierce decision still requires findings of
ultimate material facts, and does not give a Judge of Industrial Claims
authority to merely make an award or deny a claim without setting forth
sufficient justification for its basis.
IX. THE INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS COwMMSSION
The function of the Industrial Relations Commission as an appellate
review body remains unchanged, subject to the modifications of the Pierce
decision, Section VIII supra. The Industrial Relations Commission can-
not make separate findings of fact, 1 and its review authority is limited
to matters properly raised before it by the parties5 2
The filing of an application for review with the Industrial Relations
Commission confers jurisdiction on it insofar as the subject matter of the
application is concerned. The Florida Appellate Rules do not apply, and
there is no additional time given for mailing. 58 In applying its own rules,
the Industrial Relations Commission has discretion,54 and failure to com-
ply with the rules of appellate procedure is grounds for dismissal of the
appeal.55 The Industrial Relations Commission has granted hearings de
novo where the transcript of proceedings was found insufficient to permit
an intelligent review. 5'
50. Pierce v. Piper Aircraft Corp., 279 So. 2d 281, 284 (Fla. 1973).
51. Woodard v. Board of Pub. Instr., 278 So. 2d 620 (Fla. 1973).
52. Rosenbush v. City of N. Miami Beach, 281 So. 2d 298 (Fla. 1973).
93. Henry MacaUlster House Mover v. Johnson, 281 So. 2d 306 (Fla. 1973).
54. Federal Elec. Corp. v. Best, 274 So. 2d 886 (Fla. 1973).
55. Henderson's Portion Pak v. Jones, 281 So. 2d 342 (Fla. 1973).
56. Millis v. McCann Hardware Co., 278 So. 2d 278 (Fla. 1973); Wardell v. Troplcana
Prods., Inc., 2S6 So. 2d 212 (Fla. 1971).
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X. REVIEw By THE SUPREME COURT
Judicial review of Industrial Relations Commission orders has not
changed since the last survey. In Sims v. Palm Beach County Board of
County Commissioners,5 7 the court held that an order of remand by the
Industrial Relations Commission was a final order and thus reviewable
by the supreme court. And in Millis v. McCann Hardware Co.,58 the court
held that interlocutory orders of the Industrial Relations Commission are
reviewable.
XI. AVERAGE WEEKLY WAGE
Three cases were decided by the Court since the last survey concern-
ing average weekly wage. A volunteer policeman who received no salary
but who did receive a uniform was granted the minimum weekly com-
pensation rate of $8 based upon receipt of the uniform.59 The furnishing
of meals, without more, was found sufficient to support an award in
Muzika v. Butler Enterprises, Inc.60
The rule concerning combining of wages from concurrent employ-
ments was broadened to permit the combination without respect to simil-
arity of jobs in American Uniform & Rental Service v. Trainer.61 In that
case, the court stated:
If the injury occurring on the part-time job has disabled
the employee from working at his full-time job, his capacity as a
wage earner is impaired beyond the limits of the part-time job
and his compensation should be based on the combined wages.
The purpose of the Act is to compensate for loss of wage earning
capacity due to work-connected injury. It is the capacity of the
"whole man" not the capacity of the part-time or full-time
worker that is involved."2
The method of computation of average weekly wage where there are
concurrent employments is to average the total amount of wages actually
earned for the 13 weeks immediately prior to the injury, one-thirteenth
thereof constituting the average weekly wage.
XII. ATTORNEY'S FEES
The claimants' attorneys have been held entitled to recover at-
torney's fees during the period surveyed where a claim was not paid
within 21 days and the carrier's doctor delayed sending in the medical
report for a period in excess of 21 days after maximum recovery had been
57. 277 So. 2d 530 (Fa. 1973).
58. 278 So. 2d 278 (FIa. 1973).
59. Rosenbush v. City of N. Miami Beach, 281 So. 2d 298 (Fla. 1973).
60. 269 So. 2d 353 (Fa. 1972).
61. 262 So. 2d 193 (Fla. 1972).
62. Id. at 194.
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attained,6" on medical benefits, as well as payment of medical bills, 4 and
in equitable distribution proceedings in third-party cases."5
In Johnson v. Brasington-Cadillac Oldsmobile, Inc.,"6 the first com-
pensation check was issued August 26, 1968, showing a pay period from
June 29, 1968 to August 25, 1968. The claimant testified that he informed
the employer of his claim on or about June 26, 1968. Since compensation
payments did not commence within the period of 21 days from receipt of
notice of accident as required by section 440.34(1) of the Florida Statutes
(1971), attorney's fees were held to be assessable against the employer.
The opinion does not state that a formal claim was filed, but only that
notice of claim was given the employer by the claimant.
In determining the reasonable value of attorney's fees, evidence must
be presented unless the parties stipulate to a sum certain. 67 On one occa-
sion the court reversed an award of $16,000 attorney's fees as excessive.6 8
In a further expansion of his powers, the Judge of Industrial Claims
now has jurisdiction to determine the claim of two or more attorneys to
an attorney's fee and to determine the pro rata share of each. 9
However, a Judge of Industrial Claims does not have jurisdiction to
award attorney's fees for appellate services, it being the sole function of
the appellate tribunal before whom the legal services were rendered.7
XIII. WAIVER AND ESTOPPEL
Only one decision was entered by the Supreme Court of Florida
regarding estoppel. In that case, the claimant went to a physician of his
own selection and neither requested the physician's services nor were
they found to be required. However, based upon the claimant's physician's
opinion regarding disability, the employer voluntarily increased the claim-
ant's compensation payments in conformity with this physician's opinion.
In estopping the employer to deny responsibility for the billing, the court
held in Miller v. Tribune Co.:71
Such an objection is so inconsistent with the increase in com-
pensation payments based upon the very examination for which
claimant seeks reimbursement, that we must hold the employer
estopped from asserting it.
63. Lindsley Lumber v. Thomas, Industrial Relations Comm'n decision 2-2306 (Feb. 9,
1973).
64. Perez v. Carillon Hotel, 272 So. 2d 488 (Fla. 1973); Carter v. Tom Carter's Wheels,
Inc., 257 So. 2d 529 (Fla. 1972).
65. Del-Cook Trucking Co. v. Bristol, 253 So. 2d 148 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1971).
66. 265 So. 2d 8 (Fla. 1972).
67. Heavy Constructors, Inc. v. Dricho, 259 So. 2d 489 (Fla. 1972).
68. Caropreso v. Publix Super Markets, 277 So. 2d 279 (Fla. 1973).
69. Sardella v. Champion Mfg. Co., 273 So. 2d 369 (Fla. 1973); Lopez v. Airlift Int'l
Inc., 270 So. 2d 1 (Fla. 1973).
70. Riviera v. Deauville Hotel, 277 So. 2d 265 (Fla. 1973).
71. 275 So. 2d 242, 243 (Fla. 1973).
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XIV. PROCEDURE
The statutory requirement contained in section 440.18, Florida Stat-
utes (1973), that notice of injury or death in respect to which compensa-
tion is payable be given within 30 days after the date of such injury or
death was found to be complied with in Hester v. Westchester General
Hospital.72 In that case, the claimant believed she gave oral notice to her
superiors but was not certain as to the date. The Judge of Industrial
Claims found that although the giving of notice may appear to be late
and indefinite, even if the notice of injury was beyond the statutory limit,
the employer was not prejudiced thereby. The award of benefits was
affirmed.
Where hearings are requested, the court held in Best v. Halloway
Materials, that notice of the hearing need not be given to each and every
insurance carrier involved. 78 That particular case dealt with notice to a
reinsurance carrier.
In permanent total disability cases, it was again ruled that where
evidence produced by a claimant established that a reasonably stable
labor market for the claimant did not exist in view of his disabilities and
background, the burden of proof shifted to the employer to show that
some form of regular employment was, in fact, within reach of the
claimant.74
The burden is upon the claimant to prove causal relationship be-
tween his injury and disability with reasonable medical probability, not
possibility. In Nelson v. Hebrew Home for Aged 7 5 an award of disability
was reinstated wherein a review of the medical opinion established that
even though the testifying physician rarely handled workmen's compen-
sation cases and that his overall testimony indicated he was unfamiliar
with the precise terminology of the causal relationship test established by
the court, his testimony, under the circumstances, was sufficient to permit
the conclusion that a causal relationship existed.
In Versailles Hotel v. Lopez,76 the parties were limited to that testi-
mony presented within the time limits prescribed by rules 3 and 11 of
the Workmen's Compensation Rules of Procedure and the cause remanded
for entry of an order based on the evidence presented within those time
limits. Testimony taken beyond these time limits was held not properly
admitted into evidence.
A dismissal of a claim by a Judge of Industrial Claims based upon
an employer's motion to dismiss and granted without any testimony or
evidence being presented was found improper in Maysles v. May.7 There
72. 260 So. 2d 505 (Fla. 1972); see also Brown v. Southern Chem. Inc., 274 So. 2d
529 (Fla. 1973).
73. 272 So. 2d 514 (Fla. 1973).
74. 265 So. 2d 8 (Fla. 1972); Gibson v. Minute Maid Corp., 251 So. 2d 260 (Fla. 1971).
75. 276 So. 2d 468 (Fla. 1973).
76. Industrial Relations Comm'n decision 2-2285 (Mar. 12, 1973).
77. 251 So. 2d 251 (Fla. 1971).
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the Industrial Relations Commission affirmed the order of dismissal based
upon its determination that the findings of fact of the Judge of Indus-
trial Claims were supported by competent substantial evidence. In
reversing and remanding the cause for further hearing, the court stated:
"This is hardly possible when there had been no hearing upon which
'findings' could be based."' 8
Pursuant to agreement, counsel for both parties prepared proposed
orders at the request of the Judge of Industrial Claims in Skeen v. Great
Atlantic & Pacific Tea Co.79 Inadvertently, the Judge of Industrial Claims
signed the order presented by the claimant's counsel which was subse-
quently rescinded; and, thereafter, the Judge of Industrial Claims entered
the order prepared by the employer's counsel. On review, the Industrial
Relations Commission reversed and remanded the cause with direc-
tions that the Judge enter an order based upon his own independent con-
clusions. The supreme court granted certiorari and held that the Indus-
trial Relations Commission erred in that the last order of the Judge of
Industrial Claims was supported by competent substantial evidence and
should have been affirmed.
In reviewing the procedure prescribed by Commission rule 6(c)
regarding insolvency petitions, it was held in Bradshaw v. Miami Provi-
sion Co.,8" that rule 6 is not mandatory and that the Judge did not
err in exercising his discretion and considering the claimant's insolvency
petition. In that case, there were special circumstances which precluded
the claimant from filing his affidavit of insolvency as required by the
rule. Rather, his attorney executed the insolvency petition which was
held sufficient.
The taxation of the cost of the preparation of a record on appeal
against the employer and carrier was held proper in Perez v. Carillon
Hotel,81 the court apparently rereating from a prior decision that may
be in conflict with this holding.
XV. CoMMissioN RULES
During the period surveyed, the Industrial Relations Commission
adopted new rules. These rules were adopted and approved by the
Supreme Court of Florida on November 14, 1973.82 No decisions have
been entered interpreting the rules to date.
XVI. MODIFICATION
Modification of a prior award of compensation based upon a change
of economic conditions rather than physical conditions was upheld by
78. Id. at 252.
79. 254 So. 2d 783 (Fla. 1972).
80. 261 So. 2d 829 (Fla. 1972).
81. 272 So. 2d 488 (Fla. 1973).
82. In re Florida Workmen's Compensation Rules of Procedure, 285 So. 2d 601 (Fla.
1973).
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the Industrial Relations Commission in DuPont Plaza Hotel v. Travelers
Insurance Co.8' The affirming order was a departure from prior inter-
pretations by the Industrial Relations Commission of the modification
provisions of the Workmen's Compensation Act which previously held
that a showing of change of condition must be based upon a physical
change of condition rather than an economic change of condition.
Modification was upheld in other cases where the claimant had a
subsequent heart attack following his original compensable heart attack,
84
worsening of condition by subsequent conversion reaction brought on by
stress and excitement,85 inability to continue working due to increased
pain and greater restriction and limitations of physical activities," change
of condition due to subsequent surgery, 87 and a change of condition due
to deteriorated mental and physical condition which was found to cause
the claimant to become unemployable.
XVII. THnu PARTIES
In an extensive opinion summarizing earlier decisions regarding the
law on third-party tortfeasors, the Supreme Court of Florida held in
Smith v. Ussery,8 that the exclusive remedy provided for by the Work-
men's Compensation Act did not apply under the facts in that case. There,
Hialeah Hospital was putting on an addition. It has a named general
contractor but, in fact, was acting as its own general contractor, and the
injured workman was not a statutory fellow servant. A similar result was
reached in Florida Power & Light Co. v. Brown, 9 wherein the District
Court of Appeal, Third District, found Florida Power & Light Company
not to be a contractor as contemplated by the Workmen's Compensation
Act when sued by an employee of an independent contractor engaged
by the utility company to provide alternate electric feed to electrical
power vaults.
In Gulf American Fire & Casualty Co. v. Singleton,9" it was held
that the exclusive remedy doctrine applied only to employers and did
not extend to a negligent individual employee. In that case, the defen-
dant employee was operating a truck which caused injuries to plaintiff
and the plaintiff's ultimate death."' Doctors and hospitals rendering ser-
vice to injured employees under the Workmen's Compensation Act do
83. Industrial Relations Comm'n decision 2-2326 (Sept. 24, 1973).
84. Soloff v. U-Totem, Inc., 257 So. 2d 31 (Fla. 1971).
85. Arroyo v. Crown Hotel, 275 So. 2d 226 (Fla. 1973).
86. Moncrief v. Hollywood Heights Shell Serv. Station, 259 So. 2d 713 (Fla. 1972).
87. Hill v. United States Pre-Cast Corp., 280 So. 2d 417 (Fla. 1973).
88. 261 So. 2d 164 (Fla. 1972).
89. 274 So. 2d 558 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1973).
90. 265 So. 2d 720 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1972).
91. Kolarik v. Rodgers Bros. Serv., Inc., 268 So. 2d 187 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1972) (company
which furnished crane, cables and operator held not to be a third party).
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not share in the immunity afforded the employer for their malpractice
in treating the injured workmen. 2
XVIII. SUBROGATION AND EQUITABLE DISTRIBUTION
The previously reported district court of appeal decision in Aetna
Casualty & Surety Co. v. Bortz, 3 was reviewed by the supreme court
and reversed. The district court had held that a carrier which brought
suit and settled the lawsuit during the second year following the injury
was only entitled to equitable distribution from the recovery rather
than full benefits. In reversing the district court, the supreme court stated
that the compensation carrier was entitled to full recovery of its lien.
In addition, the carrier was the controlling party plaintiff in the litigation
and while it would have been permissible to allow the claimant's indi-
vidual counsel to be added to the cause for purpose of assisting the
carrier, it was held error on the part of the trial judge to order a substi-
tution of counsel over the objection of the carrier.
Where a third-party suit was filed by the claimant on his own behalf
within one year after the accident, the workmen's compensation insur-
ance carrier had no right of intervention, its rights being limited to the
filing of a notice of payment of workmen's compensation benefits and
lien upon any recovery. 4 In Maryland Casualty Co. v. Smith, 5 a claimant
settled his third-party claim during the second year without notice to his
employer's workmen's compensation carrier. The workmen's compen-
sation carrier had not filed a tort claim and was limited to recovery of
only equitable distribution.
In the case of Brown v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance
Co.,9  the claimant was injured in an automobile accident while making
a delivery for his employer. The third-party tortfeasor and its insurance
carrier settled the claim for $9,000. A release was given by the claimant.
Thereafter, the claimant filed claims for and received payments of com-
pensation from his employer's workmen's compensation carrier. Three
months later, the compensation carrier filed suit in the claimant's name
against the third-party tortfeasor and third-party insurance carrier. The
dismissal of the compensation carrier's claim with prejudice was reversed
and the cause remanded for further consideration, including the determi-
nation as to whether the third-party tortfeasor or his insurer had notice,
actual or constructive, of rights vested or to become vested in a work-
men's compensation carrier. Also to be considered was the overall fair-
92. Cook v. Eney, 277 So. 2d 848 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1973) (receipt of compensation benefits
not material evidence) ; Pyles v. Bridges, 259 So. 2d 724 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1972).
93. 246 So. 2d 114 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1971).
94. Commercial Standard Ins. Co. v. Miller, 274 So. 2d 588 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1973).
95. 272 So. 2d 517 (Fla. 1973).
96. 281 So. 2d 364 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1973).
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ness of the settlement in light of the injuries, the ability of the employee
to determine for himself the fairness of the settlement, the length of time
between the injury and settlement, and the filing of the claim for work-
men's compensation benefits, possible deliberate concealment of the
settlement on the part of the claimant, and notice on the part of the
workmen's compensation carrier that a settlement had occurred. It was
further held that these same considerations would also play a part in
determining the amount of equitable distribution the workmen's com-
pensation carrier would receive.
XIX. CONCLUSION
Both legislatively and judicially, the Workmen's Compensation
Act has been broadened in its coverage and benefits provided. In the
processing of contested claims, the most significant decision was the
Pierce97 decision which reduced the requirements for determination of
an award or denial of benefits by the Judge of Industrial Claims. This
decision, along with additional case law, is a continuation by the courts
of an increase in the authority, power and prestige of the office of Judge
of Industrial Claims.
97. 279 So. 2d 281 (Fla. 1973).
